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The Compulsory Extraction of Blood
from Convicted Offenders and the
Fourth Amendment-
PART I
The new millennium has ushered various technological
advances into the criminal justice system. Most notable in
recent years is the use of DNA evidence and databases in the
field of law enforcement. In an effort to expand DNA databases,
Congress enacted the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of
2000.1 The DNA Act authorizes the collection, analysis, and
storage of blood samples obtained from individuals who have
been convicted of a qualifying federal offense,' and authorizes
funding to update local governments' DNA analysis
procedures.3
As this new technology emerges, courts have attempted
to define the constitutional contours of using such innovations
in law enforcement. As Ninth Circuit Judge Reinhardt stated:
Each leap forward in forensic science promises ever more efficient
and swift resolution of criminal investigations. At the same time,
technological advances frequently raise new constitutional concerns
and threaten our basic liberties. Here, we confront the challenge
compulsory DNA collection poses to one of the most fundamental and
traditional preserves of individual privacy, the human body.'
The Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits of the United States
Court of Appeals have recently confronted this challenge and
© 2004 Timothy D. Sini. All rights reserved.
42 U.S.C. § 14135 et seq. (2000) [hereinafter referred to as the "DNA Act"
or the "Act"].
2 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)-(2).
3 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a).
4 United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th. Cir. 2003) [hereinafter
Kincade 11 (invalidating the DNA Act under the Fourth Amendment), rev'd en banc,
379 F.3d 813, 839 (2004) (plurality decision) [hereinafter Kincade III (upholding the
DNA Act under the Fourth Amendment).
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decided whether the Fourth Amendment permits the
compulsory extraction of blood' from convicted offenders,
without any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, in order to
maintain the FBI's DNA database
In deciding this question, the circuits have divided in
their analytical approaches. In 2003, the Tenth Circuit in
United States v. Kimler held that the DNA Act was
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment,7 while the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Kincade (Kincade I) held to the
contrary Both the Tenth and Ninth circuits applied the
"special needs" doctrine in determining the DNA Act's Fourth
Amendment constitutionality,' a categorical exception to the
Fourth Amendment's individualized suspicion requirement.1'
However, this past year, both the Fifth Circuit, in Groceman v.
United States Department of Justice," and the Ninth Circuit en
banc, in United States v. Kincade (Kincade II)," rejected the
special needs approach and applied the "totality of the
circumstances" standard under which each court sustained the
DNA Act's Fourth Amendment constitutionality.
This Note suggests that the Ninth Circuit's original
decision in Kincade I is the most persuasive of the four circuit
court decisions. Part II of this Note briefly discusses the DNA
Act and the Fourth Amendment's totality of the circumstances
standard and special needs exception. Part III discusses the
' Because blood is easier to test and preserve than saliva or other bodily
substances, the federal and participating state and local governments collect DNA by
extracting blood. Kincade 11, 379 F.3d at 816 (citing Nancy Beatty Gregoire, Federal
Probation Joins the World of DNA Collection, 66 FED. PROB. 30, 31 (2002)). Although
there may be no difference for purposes of the Fourth Amendment between drawing
blood or, say, swabbing the inside of an individual's mouth, this Note only addresses
the compulsory extraction of blood.
6 See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 839 (invalidating the DNA Act under the
Fourth Amendment); Groceman v. United States Dep't of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 414
(5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (same); Kincade 1, 345 F.3d at 1113 (upholding the DNA
Act under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Plotts, 347 F.3d 873, 877 (10th
Cir. 2003) (invalidating the DNA Act under the Fourth Amendment); United States v.
Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th. Cir. 2003) (same), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 945
(2003).
Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1146.
8 Kincade 1, 345 F.3d at 1113.
9 Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1146 ("The DNA Act . . . is a reasonable search and
seizure under the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement.. . ."); Kincade 1, 345 F.3d at 1104 ("The Special Needs Doctrine Does Not
Exempt the Extraction of Blood from Parolee's Bodies from the Ordinary Requirements
of the Fourth Amendment").
'0 See infra Part II.B.2.
1 Groceman, 354 F.3d at 413-14.
1 Kincade 11, 379 F.3d at 835, 839.
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application of the totality of the circumstances test in
Groceman and Kincade H and the application of the special
needs doctrine in Kimler"' and Kincade I. Part IV suggests that
the special needs test is the more appropriate approach in
determining the DNA Act's Fourth Amendment
constitutionality. It then applies the special needs analysis to
the DNA Act and concludes that the Act is unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment.
PART II
A. The DNA Act
The DNA Act authorizes prison and probation officials
to collect DNA samples from individuals who have been
convicted of a qualifying federal offense. The list of qualifying
offenses is extensive and includes any offense relating to
homicide, sexual abuse, peonage, robbery, burglary, and
kidnapping. 5 To begin the collection process, the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons or the probation office responsible notifies
the convicted offender of the Act's requirements and
la See Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1146 (dismissing Kimler's Fourth Amendment
argument in one paragraph).
14 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)-(2). The DNA Act also authorizes the Attorney
General to appropriate funds to states in order to enhance their ability to utilize DNA
evidence and databases in law enforcement. The Act provides for funding to states (1)
to conduct DNA analyses of samples retrieved from qualifying state offenders and
crime scenes for inclusion in the FBI's database and (2) to increase the capacity of
laboratories owned by the state to carry out such analysis. 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a)(1)-(3).
For a state to be eligible to receive a grant, it must "provide assurances that [it] has
implemented, or will implement . . .a comprehensive plan for the expeditious DNA
analysis of samples . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 14135(b)(1) (allowing states 120 days after the
date of application for funds to implement "a comprehensive plan for the . . .DNA
analysis of samples"). The Act directs recipient states to use the funds "to conduct...
DNA analyses of [the] samples that relate to crimes in connection with which there are
no suspects." 42 U.S.C. § 14135(c).
15 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d). Participating states have comparatively more
expansive lists. See D.H. Kaye and Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases:
Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV.
413, 417, n.15 (2003) [hereinafter Kaye and Smith, Case for Population-Wide
Coverage]. Similarly, the scope of state DNA databases has expanded to include
individuals not convicted of crimes. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:601-09 (West Supp.
2004); TEX. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 411.142 (Vernon 1998 & Supp. 2004). See also Bonnie
L. Taylor, Note, Storing DNA Samples of Non-Convicted Persons & The Debate Over
DNA Database Expansion, 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 509, 512-515 (2003). For an
argument for including arrestees in DNA databanks, see generally D.H. Kaye, The
Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 455
(2001) [hereinafter Kaye, DNA Sampling on Arrest]. For an argument for a population-
wide DNA databank, see generally supra Kaye and Smith, Case for Population-Wide
Coverage.
20041
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
subsequently retrieves the person's blood. " Authorized officials
may use "such means as are reasonably necessary to detain,
restrain, and collect a DNA sample from [such] individual ...
. Failing to cooperate in the collection of one's DNA sample
pursuant to the Act is a class A misdemeanor.18
After the collection process, the FBI receives and
analyzes the blood," and the results are stored in the Combined
DNA Index System (CODIS), a computerized network linking
nationwide DNA databases.0 CODIS contains DNA records of
convicted persons and DNA samples from crime scenes,
unidentified human remains, and missing persons.2 The DNA
evidence in CODIS is permanently available to federal, state,
and local law enforcement officials for facilitating investigation
and prosecution of crimes.'
The DNA Act has drastically expanded DNA analysis
and the use of CODIS throughout the country. In 1990, CODIS
began as an experimental project, serving 14 state and local
laboratories.' Currently, it serves all 50 states' and has
assisted in more than nineteen thousand investigations across
the nation.' With the government subjecting more individuals
16 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(b).
17 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(4)(a).
18 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(5).
19 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(b).
20 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a).
The FBI Laboratory's Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) blends forensic
science and computer technology into an effective tool for solving violent
crimes. CODIS enables federal, state, and local crime labs to exchange and
compare DNA profiles electronically, thereby linking crimes to each other and
to convicted offenders.
The FBI's CODIS Home Page, Mission Statement and Background, at
httpJ/www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/program.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2004) [hereinafter
CODIS Home Page, Mission Statement and Background].
2' Groceman v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 3:01-CV-1619-G, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11491, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 26, 2002), affd, Groceman v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 354 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
22 See The FBI's CODIS Home Page, National DNA Index System, at
httpJ/www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/national.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2004). See also
Kincade 1, 345 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th. Cir. 2003) ("Federal, state, and local law
enforcement officials who conduct such investigations are able to compare CODIS
information with DNA evidence obtained from crime scenes and, thereby, to identify
the perpetrator, and subject him to prosecution.").
2 See CODIS Home Page, Mission Statement and Background, supra note
20.
24 The FBI's CODIS Home Page, Participating States, at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/partstates.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
2' The FBI's CODIS Home Page, Investigations Aided, at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/success.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2004). But see Kincade
1, 345 F.3d at 1097-98 ("CODIS is currently a part of at least 137 laboratories
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to DNA collection pursuant to the Act, challenges to its
constitutionality have recently surfaced. In less than two years,
four circuit courts have addressed the DNA Act's Fourth
Amendment validity.
B. The Analytical Divide Between the Totality of the
Circumstances Standard and the Special Needs Doctrine
As noted above, in determining the Act's Fourth
Amendment constitutionality, an analytical divide has
developed between the circuits that apply the totality of the
circumstances test and those that apply the special needs
doctrine. Under the totality of the circumstances approach,
courts focus only on whether the search is reasonable." They
disregard the usual requirement of individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing and weigh all relevant interests, including the
countervailing interests of law enforcement and the
individual.' Conversely, under the special needs doctrine,
courts begin from the premise that searches lacking
individualized suspicion are unreasonable. They will only
inquire into the search's reasonableness if the search serves a
special need beyond normal law enforcement purposes.'
1. The Totality of the Circumstances Standard
The Supreme Court recently applied the totality of the
circumstances standard in United States v. Knights. ° In
Knights, the Court addressed whether reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing was sufficient to justify a search of a probationer's
home. 1 Although probable cause and a warrant are usually
necessary to search an individual's home,2 the Court looked at
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search in
throughout the country, and as of 2002, had provided forensic assistance in more than
1,900 investigations in 31 states.").
16 See infra text accompanying note 34.
" See infra Part III.A.
28 See infra text accompanying note 49-54.
See infra text accompanying notes 65-67. See also infra Part III.B. There
are of course other exceptions to the individualized suspicion requirement, but no court
has considered them in analyzing the DNA Act.
30 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (upholding a search of a
probationer's home based upon reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing).
21 Id. at 116-21.
32 Id. at 118-19.
2004]
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order to determine whether the lesser standard of reasonable
suspicion was sufficient.33 The Court explained that:
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the
reasonableness of a search is determined 'by assessing, on the one
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy
and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion
of legitimate government interests.34
In assessing the search's intrusion on the probationer's
privacy rights, the Court considered the probationer's
diminished expectation of privacy in his home." It likened
probation to other forms of punishment, including
incarceration.' The Court also noted that upon accepting
probation as a punishment, Knights and other similarly
situated probationers were informed that law enforcement
could search their property without a warrant.37
Against these privacy considerations, the Court weighed
the governmental interests in searching the probationer's
home.' The Court noted the state's dual concern in its
probation system: "On the one hand is the hope that [a
probationer] will successfully complete the probation and be
integrated back into the community. On the other hand is the
concern . . . that he will be more likely to engage in criminal
conduct than an ordinary member of the community."39
Emphasizing the latter, the Court cited findings which indicate
that "[tihe recidivism rate of probationers is significantly
higher than the general crime rate."4 1 It therefore concluded
that law enforcement may "focus on probationers in a way that
it does not on the ordinary citizen."
14
Notably, however, the Supreme Court did not hold that
probationary status eradicates the traditional requirement of
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. 3 The law enforcement
officials in Knights clearly had at least reasonable suspicion to
' Id. at 118.
34 Id. at 118-19 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
35 Knights, 534 U.S. at 119.
36 Id.
37 Id.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 120-21.
40 Knights, 534 U.S. at 120.
41 Id. at 121.
41 Id. at 120 n.6.
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search the probationer's home.4 ' Local law enforcement
suspected Knights of being involved in the vandalism of an
electrical company's vault, which was pried open and set on fire
with gasoline." Knights had a clear motive for the crime, and
"just a week before the arson, a sheriffs deputy had stopped
Knights and [his friend] ... and observed pipes and gasoline in
[his friend's] pickup truck."5 A detective arranged surveillance
of Knights's apartment and observed a friend of Knights exit
the apartment carrying what looked like pipe bombs.' The
detective also observed several items in the bed of a pickup
truck parked in Knights's driveway linking him to the arson of
the vault, including "a Molotov cocktail.. . , a gasoline can, and
two brass padlocks that fit the description of those removed
from the . . . vault."' As a result, the Court did not have to
"decide whether the probation condition so diminished, or
completely eliminated, Knight's reasonable expectation of
privacy . . . that a search . . . without any individualized
suspicion would have satisfied the reasonableness requirement
of the Fourth Amendment.""
This would have been a difficult question for the Court
considering it has repeatedly held that "a search . . . is
ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing."" Indeed, the Fourth Amendment
usually requires a judicial warrant issued upon a showing of
probable cause to conduct a search" in order to "safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions[.]" "1 Even in the limited instances like Knights where
a showing of reasonable suspicion-a lower evidentiary
standard than probable cause-may be sufficient to justify a
43 Id.
" Id. at 114,
45 Knights, 534 U.S. at 114-15.
46 Id. at 115.
41 Id. at 115.
4 Id. at 120 n.6.
49 Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). See also Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997) ("To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a
search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.").
'0 See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002) ("In the criminal context, reasonableness usually
requires a showing of probable cause."). See also Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67,
77-79 (2001) (holding that searches unsupported by either a warrant or probable cause
are constitutional only when special needs, other than the normal need for law
enforcement, provide sufficient justification).
5' Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (quoting Camara v. San
Francisco Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
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search,"2  some quantum of individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing is almost always required.'
2. The Fourth Amendment's Special Needs Exception
The Supreme Court, however, has upheld an extremely
narrow regime of suspicionless searches "where the program
[is] designed to serve 'special needs, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement."" In Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton, for example, the Supreme Court upheld suspicionless
drug testing of student-athletes under the special needs
exception to the warrant requirement."5 The Court noted that
"[a] search unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional
. . . 'when special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
requirement impracticable."" Finding special needs in the
public school context, the Court explained that "the warrant
requirement 'would unduly interfere with the maintenance of
the swift and informal disciplinary procedures... needed" and
the ability of "'teachers and administrators . . . to maintain
order in the schools.""' 7
The Supreme Court has never upheld a suspicionless
search under the special needs exception where the primary
purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing." In Indianapolis v. Edmond, a leading special
needs case, the Court invalidated a drug interdiction program
2 See, e.g., Knights, 534 U.S. at 122.
52 See, e.g., Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37.
54id.
' Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
56 Id. at 653 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
57 Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-341 (1985)). See also
Nat'l Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 664-66 (1989) (upholding
suspicionless drug testing of U.S. Customs agents with the primary purpose of
deterring "drug use among those eligible for promotion to sensitive positions within the
Service and to prevent the promotion of drug users to those positions"); United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557, 562 (1976) (upholding a suspicionless
checkpoint program designed to intercept illegal aliens along the border when
requiring "reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends
to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to
be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens").
w4 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-44. "[W]e would not credit the 'general interest in
crime control' as justification for a regime of suspicionless stops." Id. at 41 (quoting
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)). See also Ferguson v. Charleston,
532 U.S. 67, 77-79 (2001) (holding that searches unsupported by individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing are constitutional only when special needs, other than the
normal need for law enforcement, provide sufficient justification).
[Vol. 70:1
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under the Fourth Amendment because the primary purpose of
the checkpoint was to generate evidence of normal criminal
activity." The Court noted that "the gravity of the threat alone
cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what means law
enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given purpose. " '
Rather, it instructed courts to consider in tandem the liberty
interests and the particular law enforcement practices at
issue.
Similarly, in Ferguson v. Charleston, the Supreme Court
held that individualized suspicion is required under the Fourth
Amendment when the search's primary purpose is inseparable
from the state's general interest in crime control." There, the
Court invalidated a state hospital's policy to test the urine of
pregnant patients who met certain symptom criteria in order to
obtain evidence of cocaine use, which was in turn reported to
the police.' The Court concluded that the program fell outside
of the Fourth Amendment's special needs exception because
"the primary purpose .. .was to use the threat of arrest and
prosecution in order to force women into [drug] treatment.""
Both Edmond and Ferguson instruct courts to ascertain
a search's primary purpose in order to determine whether it
falls under the special needs exception." To do so, according to
the Supreme Court, a court must engage in a close review of
the statute's "programmatic purpose" by considering "all the
available evidence." When the primary purpose is a special
need, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, the court
must go on to balance the individual's privacy expectations
against the government's interest to determine whether it
would be impractical to require some level of individualized
suspicion."
Because the DNA Act authorizes the search of
probationers and prisoners without any suspicion that they
have committed or will commit another offense,' courts
59 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42.
60 Id. at 42.
" Id. at 42-43.
62 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 67.
Id. at 70-73.
' Id. at 84.
Id. at 81; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46.
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81. See also Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46-47.
67 Natl Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) (citing
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1989)).
m Kincade 1, 345 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th. Cir. 2003).
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determining its Fourth Amendment constitutionality have
begun their analyses by deciding whether to apply the special
needs doctrine or the totality of the circumstances test. The
analytical split is indeed a real one: Several courts have
applied the special needs doctrine," including the opinions in
Kimler and Kincade I, while several others have applied the
totality of the circumstances standard,7 including the opinions
in Groceman and Kincade H.
69 The following courts have applied the special needs doctrine in
determining the Fourth Amendment constitutionality of a DNA collection statute:
Kincade 11, 379 F.3d 813, 840 (2004) (Gould, J. concurring opinion) (DNA Act); Green v.
Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004) (Wisconsin DNA collection statute); United
States v. Plots, 347 F.3d 873, 877 (10th Cir. 2003) (DNA Act); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d
72, 82 (2d Cir. 1999) (Connecticut DNA collection statute); Vore v. United States Dep't
of Justice, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137 (D. Ariz. 2003) (DNA Act); Miller v. United
States Parole Comm'n, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1177-78 (D. Kan. 2003) (DNA Act);
United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 323 (D. Del. 2003) (DNA Act);
Nicholas v. Goord, 01 Civ. 7891 (RCC) (GWG), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1621, at *50, 64
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2003) (New York DNA collection statute), affd mem. on other
grounds, 01 Civ. 7891 (RCC) (GWG), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11708, at *16-19 (S.D.N.Y.
June 24, 2004) (upholding the New York statute under a balancing test); United States
v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1138 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (the DNA Act); United States v.
Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1165-69 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (the DNA Act); Wisconsin v.
Martin, App. No. 03-3131, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 592, at **8 (Wis. Ct. App. July 27,
2004) (Wisconsin DNA collection statute); Washington v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1088
(Wash. 1993) (Washington DNA collection statute).
70 The following courts have applied the totality of the circumstances test or a
balancing analysis in determining the Fourth Amendment constitutionality of a DNA
collection statute: United States v. Walker, No. 03-10650, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
20553, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 2004) (DNA Act); Schaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181
(10th Cir. 1998) (Oklahoma DNA collection statute); Schlicher v. (NFN) Peters, I & I,
103 F.3d 940 (10th Cir. 1996) (Kansas DNA collection statute); Boling v. Romer, 101
F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir. 1996) (Colorado DNA collection statute); Rise v. Oregon, 59
F.3d 1556, 1558-61 (9th Cir. 1995) (Oregon DNA collection statute), cert. denied, 517
U.S. 1160 (1996); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1992) (Virginia DNA
collection statute), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992); Goord, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11708, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2004) (New York DNA collection statute); Padgett v.
Ferrero, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1343-44 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (Georgia DNA collection
statute); United States v. Stegman, 295 F. Supp. 2d 542, 548-50 (D. Md. 2003) (DNA
Act); United States v. Meier, CR No. 97-72 HA, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25755, at *11-13
(D. Or. Aug. 6, 2002) (DNA Act); United States v. Lujan, CR. No. 98-480-02 HA, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25754, at *11-13 (D. Or. July 9, 2002) (DNA Act); Vanderlinden v.
Kansas, 874 F. Supp. 1210, 1214-15 (D. Kan. 1995) (Kansas DNA collection statute);
Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F. Supp. 583, 588-89 (D. Minn. 1994) (Minnesota DNA
collection statute); Gilbert v. Peters, III, Nos. 93 C 20012, 92 C 20354, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9215, at *14-23 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 1994) (Illinois DNA collection statute).
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PART III
A. Circuit Decisions Applying the Totality of the
Circumstances Test
1. Groceman v. United States Department of Justice71
The Fifth Circuit in Groceman was the first circuit court
to address the DNA Act's constitutionality using the totality of
the circumstances standard. Rejecting the special needs
analysis, the court considered the totality of the circumstances
in determining whether the suspicionless compulsory
extraction of DNA violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the
prisoners in question."2 It balanced the "inmate's diminished
privacy rights, the minimal intrusion involved, and the
legitimate government interest in using DNA to investigate
crime."" The court concluded that prisoners have no reasonable
expectation that the government will not extract blood from
their bodies to analyze and include in a database." It likened
DNA collection to fingerprinting, explaining that individualized
suspicion is unnecessary to collect DNA from convicted
offenders because they "retain no constitutional privacy
interest against their correct identification."" In conclusion, the
court held that the Act is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirement, and its application
did not infringe the constitutional rights of the prisoners in
question."6
71 Plaintiffs, Jeffrey and Bradley Groceman, were convicted of armed bank
robbery and conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery. Groceman, 354 F.3d at 412.
The DNA Act required them to submit DNA samples. Id. They sued to enjoin the
collection of their DNA samples on Fourth Amendment grounds and the district court
dismissed their suit for failure to state a claim. Id. at 412-13. On appeal, they argued
that the DNA Act authorizes unreasonable searches in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
72 Id. at 413.
73 Groceman, 354 F.3d at 413 (citing Velaquez v. Woods, 329 F.3d 420 (5th
Cir. 2003) (per curiam)).
74 Id. at 413-14.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 414.
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2. Kincade II
The plurality in the Ninth Circuit en banc decision in
Kincade II also applied the totality of the circumstances
standard78 and held that the DNA Act's authorized searches are
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment." Reversing
Kincade I,' the plurality found the search reasonable in light of
convicted offenders' reduced expectations of privacy, the
minimal intrusiveness of blood extraction, and the
government's legitimate and compelling interests in collecting
DNA from convicted offenders."
The decision is most notable for the plurality's
comprehensive analysis of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in
order to determine whether the Act could be sustained under
the totality of the circumstances test." In effect, it addressed
whether individualized suspicion is always necessary to
conduct a search to retrieve evidence for criminal
prosecutions.' It noted several exceptions to the general rule
that the state must have a judicial warrant issued upon
probable cause to conduct such a search.' The plurality briefly
explained the exceptions and concluded that after Ferguson
and Edmond, no exception seemed to exist for suspicionless
searches designed to gather evidence for prosecutorial
purposes." The DNA Act would therefore have to serve a non-
law enforcement objective to pass constitutional muster, given
that it authorizes suspicionless searches.
7 Unlike Groceman, the challenger in Kincade was a probationer. Kincade II,
379 F.3d 813, 820 (9th. Cir. 2004). Thomas Cameron Kincade robbed a bank using a
firearm and was sentenced to ninety-seven months imprisonment, followed by three
years supervised release. Id. In 2002, he was told that he had to comply with the DNA
Act. Id. He refused and unsuccessfully challenged the DNA Act's Fourth Amendment
constitutionality in United States district court. Id. at 821. He appealed to the Ninth
Circuit and a panel of three judges held that the Act was unconstitutional. See Kincade
1, 345 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit set aside that holding and
this en banc proceeding followed. See United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir.
2004) (reh'g en banc).
78 Kincade 11, 379 F.3d at 832.
79 Id. at 839.
"0 See Kincade 1, 345 F.3d at 1104, 1113 (three judge panel invalidating the
Act within the special needs framework). See infra Part III.B.2 for the discussion of
Kincade I.
81 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 839.
82 See id. at 822-32.
' See id.
Id. at 822.
See id. at 822-27.
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However, the plurality argued that the Supreme Court's
holding in United States v. Knights removed any such obstacle
for the DNA Act.' It explained that the Supreme Court in
Knights approved a warrantless search of a probationer's home
with the intention of finding evidence of normal criminal
wrongdoing.87 The plurality noted that the Court in Knights
never mentioned Ferguson and "reference[d] Edmond only
once-and purely in passing." It interpreted this as a retreat
from Edmond's and Ferguson's insistence that "any search
conducted primarily for law enforcement purposes must be
accompanied by at least some quantum of individualized
suspicion[.1"
Although the plurality acknowledged that there was
reasonable suspicion to search Knights's home and no
individualized suspicion to search Kincade's person, it found
that this distinction was without analytical effect.' It opined
that the presence of reasonable suspicion was unrelated to
Knights's implicit rejection of the special needs doctrine." The
plurality explained that the special needs doctrine has been
applied to searches accompanied by some quantum of
individualized suspicion,' thereby making Knights's dismissal
of the special needs doctrine a departure from past cases,
rather than a different case altogether. 3 Furthermore, it
asserted that the Supreme Court in Ferguson distinguished
suspicionless searches of prisoners and probationers from
86 Kincade 11, 379 F.3d at 827-28.
87 Id. at 827.
Id. at 828 n.22.
89 Id. at 827 ("While [the Supreme Court's] recent case may seem to be
moving toward requiring that any search conducted primarily for law enforcement
purposes must be accompanied by at least some quantum of individualized suspicion,
the Court signaled the existence of possible limitations in United States v. Knights."
(citations omitted)).
90 Id. at 829.
91 Kincade 11, 379 F.3d at 829.
92 Id. ("The Court has long understood special needs analysis to be triggered
not by a complete absence of suspicion, but by a departure from the Fourth
Amendment's warrant-and-probable cause requirements."). The plurality cited Griffin
v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875-76 (1987), in which the Supreme Court upheld a search
of a probationer's home upon reasonable suspicion, reasoning that the supervision of
probationers serves a special need. Id. at 875-80.
"' See Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 828 ("Having thus upheld a warrantless
probation search designed purely to further law enforcement purposes, and having
done so wholly outside the confines of special needs analysis, Knights suggest [sic]
something of a departure from Edmond and Ferguson (and to a more limited extent
Griffin).").
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suspicionless searches of the general public.' It argued that by
doing so, the Court had laid "the framework for a
jurisprudentially sound analytic division between these two
classes of suspicionless searches."95 Taken together, the
plurality concluded that suspicionless evidentiary searches of
probationers may be upheld under a "pure totality of the
circumstances analysis, " ' even though the Supreme Court has
not specifically addressed the issue. 7
The plurality criticized Judge Reinhardt's dissent for
condemning suspicionless law enforcement searches in light of
the Supreme Court's failure to address whether the reduced
privacy expectations of convicted offenders alone could justify
the complete departure from the usual individualized suspicion
requirement.' It interpreted this abyss of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence as a reason to sit en banc and address the very
issue.' Criticizing the dissent, the plurality wrote: "[T]he
Supreme Court's not yet having squarely resolved a legal
question . . . is why we have a case to decide, and we are
heartened by Judge Reinhardt's recognition that there is good
reason [for] sitting en banc." °°
The overall effect of the en banc decision was not only to
reverse the holding of Kincade I, but to also reject the special
needs approach in favor of the totality of the circumstances
analysis. Seemingly, the former is simply the result of the
latter, given that the totality of the circumstances standard is
starkly more deferential than the special needs analysis.
Proving otherwise, however, the Tenth Circuit held that the
DNA Act is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment within
the special needs framework.''
' Id. at 832.
95 id.
96Id. at 833.
9' See id. at 830.
Kincade H, 379 F.3d at 832 n.27. ("A substantial portion of Judge
Reinhardt's dissent is devoted simply to establishing that the Supreme Court has never
expressly authorized suspicionless, arguably law enforcement-oriented searches of
conditional releasees. As we have demonstrated, the Court also has expressly declined
to condemn such searches.").
9 Id.
100 Id.
1o' See United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th. Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 945 (2003).
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B. Circuit Decisions Applying the Special Needs Analysis
1. United States v. Kimler"'
With little analysis, the Tenth Circuit found that "the
desire to build a DNA database goes beyond the ordinary law
enforcement need." °3 Finding a special need, the court justified
the absence of individualized suspicion and found the search
reasonable under a balancing test."' In support of its special
need rationale, it cited two district court cases,' 0 Miller v.
United States Parole Commission"°0 and United States v.
Sczubelek, ' and one circuit court case, Roe v. Marcotte.'
In Miller, the district court in Kansas concluded that
the Act's authorized searches fall within the special needs
exception, even though the Act's primary purpose is to solve
past and future crimes, clearly a law enforcement purpose."
The court reasoned that the searches authorized by the DNA
Act are not used to target a specific crime or individual," but
rather the Act "creates a database for solving crimes that have
not yet occurred or crimes that have occurred but are not
specifically being looked at when taking any one individual's
blood sample.""' It found that since the Act's "primary purpose
'2o Randy C. Kimler, the defendant, was convicted of one count of receiving
and distributing computerized images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
Id. at 1134. He was sentenced to eighty-seven months imprisonment and three years of
supervised release. Id. As a condition of his release, Kimler was required to cooperate
in the collection of his DNA sample pursuant to the DNA Act. Id. Following his
conviction and sentencing, he raised several issues on appeal, including that the DNA
Act violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Id.
103 Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1146.
"4 See id. at 1146. Although the court found that the search was reasonable,
it did not mention the interests it factored into the Fourth Amendment balancing test.
See id.
100 See id.
1'06 Miller v. United States Parole Comm'n, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1175-78 (D.
Kan. 2003) (finding the DNA Act constitutional under the special needs exception to
the Fourth Amendment).
107 United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 319-23 (D. Del. 2003)
(finding the DNA Act constitutional under the special needs exception to the Fourth
Amendment).
'08 Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 76-82 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding the Connecticut
DNA collection statute constitutional under the special needs exception).
'09 See Miller, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1176-77.
"0 Id. at 1176.
111 Id.
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is not investigating 'some specific wrongdoing[,J'" it serves
special needs beyond ordinary law enforcement objectives.'12
The Tenth Circuit also relied on United States v.
Sczubelek in which the district court in Delaware similarly
upheld the DNA Act under the special needs exception to the
Fourth Amendment."3 The Sczubelek court found that the DNA
Act's primary purpose is "to fill the CODIS system with DNA
samples from qualifying federal offenders." 4 Characterizing
this purpose as a special need, it offered three distinctions
between the objective of filling CODIS and normal law
enforcement activity."' First, the court explained that DNA
samples are not evidence of criminal wrongdoing because they
can only inculpate individuals "after the sample is analyzed
... Id. This reasoning was first articulated in Nicholas v. Goord, 01 Civ. 7891
(RCC) (GWG), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1621, at *42-50 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2003), affd
mem. on other grounds, 01 Civ. 7891 (RCC) (GWG), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11708, at
*5-19 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2004). In distinguishing DNA samples from the drug tests in
Ferguson, the Nicholas court contended that the latter produced evidence revealing
whether an individual had committed a particular crime. Id. at *43. By contrast, the
court argued that "DNA databank[s] prove nothing by themselves regarding whether
the donor has committed a crime." Id. at *43. Moreover, the court noted that "the data
bank's primary utility would not be to investigate past crimes but to maintain
information available to solve future crimes." Id. at *43-44. The court suspected that "if
... [the DNA database] is ever used, [it] may occur in connection with a crime that
had not even happened at the time of the sampling." Id. at *45. See also Vore v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1135 (D. Ariz. 2003) ("Unlike the
programs deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Edmond and Ferguson,
the DNA Act is not designed to discover and produce evidence of a specific individual's
criminal wrongdoing.").
113 United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 322-23 (D. Del. 2003).
1' Id. at 322. See also United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1167-
69 (S.D. Cal. 2002). The court in United States u. Reynard upheld the DNA Act under
the Fourth Amendment's special needs exception. Id. Looking to the "plain text of the
DNA Act," the court concluded that "Congress's immediate purpose in authorizing DNA
,searches' was to permit probation officers to fill the CODIS databases with ... DNA
fingerprints ... ." Id. at 1167. The court further noted that the Act requires probation
officers and prison officials, who do not normally conduct criminal investigations, to fill
the database. Id. 1167-68. In light of the primary purpose and the lack of traditional
law enforcement involvement, the court held that the DNA Act is "'programmatic' in
scope," and serves special needs, beyond normal law enforcement activity. Id. at 1168.
The court conceded that the search allows law enforcement authorities to use the DNA
to solve pending criminal cases, a normal law enforcement objective. Reynard, 220 F.
Supp. 2d at 1168 n.30. It found that this did not remove the Act from the special needs
exception, however, because the immediate purpose in enacting the DNA Act-the
creation of a more complete DNA database-is beyond normal law enforcement
activity. Id. Conversely, the court characterized the Act's ordinary law enforcement
objectives as ultimate objectives of the Act, noting that the ultimate objectives of a
search are not dispositive of the search's special needs status. Id. It then explained that
searches that ultimately achieve normal law enforcement purposes are more likely to
fit into the special needs category if the administering of the searches is non-
discretionary and uniform, as they are under the DNA Act. Id.
"" Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23.
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and then evaluated against available crime scene samples ...
"11 Second, the court emphasized that CODIS "only offers the
potential to solve crimes" because there is only a hit for every
thousand new samples.' 7 Lastly, it noted, as did the Miller
court,"8 that the searches are not connected to any specific
individual or crime.'9 It concluded therefore that the DNA Act's
objective to solve crimes is not ordinary, and that the
application of a balancing test is justified to determine the
Act's Fourth Amendment constitutionality.'20
The last of the special needs cases cited by the Tenth
Circuit was Roe v. Marcotte in which the Second Circuit upheld
the Connecticut DNA collection statute as applied to
prisoners.'2 ' The court found that the DNA statute serves the
special need of reducing the recidivism rates of sex offenders.'22
Relying upon various studies, the Marcotte court concluded
that sex offenders have a uniquely high recidivism rate and
that increased supervision decreases their likelihood to commit
sex crimes in the future.l
Finally, the Tenth Circuit criticized the district court in
United States v. Miles" for ignoring the analytical import of the
probationers' reduced privacy expectations.2 ' Applying the
special needs analysis, the Miles court found that the
diminished privacy rights of convicted offenders may weigh
into the special need balancing test, but they do not affect
whether a search actually falls under the special needs
116 Id. at 322.
117 Id. It predicted that this ratio is not likely to improve in light of the
enormous backlog of samples. Id. at 322.
118 Supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
"9 Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 322 n.14.
120 Id. at 322-23.
1 Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1999). The prisoner in question
only challenged the portion of the statute which encompassed sexual offenders. Id. at
76.
112 Id. at 79-80.
'2 Id. at 79. The court then applied a traditional balancing test and found the
search reasonable. Id. at 80, 82.
'24 United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1138-41 (E.D. Cal. 2002). The
Miles court held that the searches pursuant to the DNA Act were unconstitutional
because they lacked individualized suspicion and failed to fall within the special needs
exception. Id. The court concluded that the Act's primary purpose was to increase
prosecutions, which is an implicit and integral objective of law enforcement. Id. As a
result, it found that some quantum of individualized suspicion was needed for the Act's
authorized searches to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
120 United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 n.14 (10th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 945 (2003).
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exception.126 The Tenth Circuit disagreed and explained that
convicted offenders enjoy less privacy than the general public,
thereby affecting whether the DNA Act requires individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing to pass constitutional muster.'27
2. Kincade IF2"
The court in Kincade I similarly concluded that in order
to extract DNA from probationers, there must be individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing or a special need, beyond normal law
enforcement purposes.' In contrast to the Tenth Circuit, it
found that neither was present.3 '
Following Knights, the Kincade I court first considered
the totality of the circumstances and concluded that at least
reasonable suspicion is required to extract blood from
probationers.' It argued that although probationers have a
reduced expectation of privacy due to their lawful conviction
and subsequent state supervision, this alone does not subject
them to suspicionless searches designed to collect evidence to
use in criminal prosecutions.'32 The court refused to extend
Knights' to cover suspicionless searches for normal law
enforcement purposes in light of the absence of Supreme Court
cases upholding such searches under the totality of the
circumstances test." It therefore concluded that while
probationary status may reduce the level of suspicion required
to justify a search, it does not completely eliminate all need for
individualized suspicion. 3'
126 See Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1137-39.
127 See Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1146 n.14.
128 As noted, the Ninth Circuit en banc reversed Kincade I. Supra note 4.
121 Kincade 1, 345 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th. Cir. 2003).
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1102-03, 1104.
112 Id. at 1102 ("[A1lthough parole may reduce the degree of constitutional
protection afforded an individual's body, it does not eradicate it.").
'3 Id. ("The Knights Court did not reach the question whether searches of
parolees and probationers could lawfully be conducted in the absence of reasonable
suspicion." (emphasis in original)).
134 Kincade 1, 345 F.3d at 1102 n.20 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
526 (1984)) ("Even a prisoner, who has no legitimate expectation of privacy in his cell,
retains an expectation of privacy in his body unless there is reasonable cause to violate
his bodily integrity and a legitimate penological interest in doing so." (citations
omitted)).
135 Id. at 1103 ("[T]he government's desire to complete a comprehensive data
bank does not outweigh Kincade's reasonable expectation of privacy in his body. ...
While weighing these interests could affect the degree of suspicion or cause required to
conduct such searches, it could not serve to eliminate the requirement of individualized
[Vol. 70:1
COMPULSORY EXTRACTION OF BLOOD
The government argued, however, that when looking at
the totality of the circumstances, the court must consider the
government's interests in light of the special need in
supervising probationers, as articulated in Griffin v.
Wisconsin.13 Rejecting the government's contention, the court
noted that the special need in Griffin merely reduced the
degree of individualized suspicion required.13 The Supreme
Court in Griffin held that the special need in supervising
probationers may justify a search of a probationer's apartment
based upon reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, instead of the
usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.' According to
the Kincade I court, Griffin failed to authorize suspicionless
searches and therefore was not directly controlling in this
case. '39
More importantly, the court distinguished the primary
purposes of the DNA search and the search in Griffin."° It
explained that the special need in Griffin was "directly related
to the administration of parole[,]" while the primary purpose of
the DNA Act is to solve future crimes."' The court reasoned
that solving crimes is not related to the parole/probation
system because the interest in solving future crimes survives
suspicion entirely."). Finding that individualized suspicion was a constitutional floor,
the court discredited the Ninth Circuit's previous decision in Rise v. Oregon in which it
approved Oregon's analogous DNA statute. Id. at 1107-08. In Rise, the Ninth Circuit
applied a balancing test and held that the suspicionless searches were reasonable, even
though they were designed to further law enforcement objectives. Rise v. Oregon, 59
F.3d 1556, 1559-62 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1160 (1996). The Rise court
concluded that convicted offenders under state supervision lack any reasonable
expectation of privacy in their identification, and, as a result, the taking of their blood
does not infringe upon their Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 1560. The Kincade I
court explained, however, that Ferguson and Edmond debauched Rise's precedential
effect "[b]ecause Rise depended on reasoning and reached a result that the Supreme
Court has since expressly disavowed. . . ." Kincade 1, 345 F.3d at 1108. Specifically, it
argued that Ferguson and Edmond "made clear that the Court would 'decline to
suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police seek to
employ a [search] primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes.'" Id.
(quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (formatting in original)). The
Kincade I court explained that this principle applies equally to searches of prisoners
and probationers, opining that "it would be a unique construction of the Constitution to
hold that Fourth Amendment protections exist only for the benefit of the innocent, and
not for all persons in our society." Id. at 1109.
136 Kincade 1, 345 F.3d at 1103.
137 Id.
138 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872-75 (1987).
139 Kincade 1, 345 F.3d at 1103.
140 Id.
141 Id.
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and, in fact, increases after the expiration of the parole or
probationary term.1"2
The government argued alternatively that suspicionless
searches authorized under the DNA Act are constitutional
because the Act's immediate objective of filling CODIS serves a
special need.'43 The court gave no credence to the distinction the
government made between filling CODIS and gathering
evidence for criminal investigations.'" It observed: "The
purpose of these searches is no more to put samples into
CODIS than is the purpose of finger-printing to place cards
into index files."'45
Finally, the government contended that the Act's
ultimate objective in increasing the efficacy of the criminal
justice system is a special need.4 ' But as in United States v.
Miles,'47 the Kincade I court concluded that decreasing wrongful
prosecutions is not beyond normal law enforcement purposes.'
It found it "troubling" for the government to assert that
prosecutorial accuracy is beyond normal law enforcement
objectives.'49  Even if it were, the court continued, the
exoneration of the innocent "would still not serve to supplant
the primary law enforcement objective of these searches-the
solving of crimes and the prosecution of those responsible."" It
explained that the ultimate achievement of a "benign motive"
does not automatically cloak a search with the protective status
of the special needs exception."'
Moreover, the court maintained that although
exoneration of the innocent is a worthy cause, the government
does not need to "'exonerate people who do not want to be
142 Id. ("Any use of the information to solve crimes committed during a
parolee's term of supervision is fortuitous and incidental to the primary purpose of the
Act.").
'" Id. at 1111-12 (quoting the government's brief without a citation).
'44 Kincade I, 345 F.3d at 1112.
145 Id.
146 Id.
141 See United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1139 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
48 Kincade 1, 345 F.3d at 1112-13.
149 Id. at 1112. See also Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1139 ("[Tlhe accurate
prosecution of crime is an inherent and implicit goal of the government's ordinary law
enforcement objective.").
'50 Kincade 1, 345 F.3d at 1112.
... Id. The court noted that "the special needs cases provide a narrow
exception to the ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements, not a convenient means by
which to avoid the strictures of the Constitution." Id. (emphasis in original).
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exonerated.'. Convicted felons who believe they are innocent
can volunteer their DNA, leaving no reason to forcibly seize
DNA in the name of the innocent. The court suggested that a
statute requiring the government to collect and analyze the
DNA upon the request of convicted felons would serve the
asserted purpose without offending the Fourth Amendment."u
As a result, the court opined that the government's concerns
regarding the innocent are likely disingenuous.M
In conclusion, the court held that "forced blood
extractions pursuant to the [DNA Act] violate the Fourth
Amendment because they constitute suspicionless searches
with the objective of furthering law enforcement purposes.""' In
accordance with Knights, the court noted that the DNA Act
must condition searches on the finding of reasonable suspicion
in order for the Act to pass constitutional muster."'
PART IV
The Ninth Circuit's Kincade I decision is the most
persuasive decision in two important respects. First, the Ninth
Circuit panel correctly delineated the special needs doctrine as
the more appropriate approach in determining the Act's Fourth
Amendment constitutionality, in contrast to the totality of the
circumstances standard endorsed by the Fifth Circuit and the
Ninth Circuit en banc."1 Second, the Ninth Circuit panel's
special needs analysis comports more with Supreme Court
precedent than the Tenth Circuit's analysis and is therefore a
more honest judicial review."
A. The Special Needs Analysis: The More Appropriate
Approach for Analyzing the DNA Act
In this context, a court's determination of the correct
analytical approach is of paramount importance. Considering
the typically lax review under the totality of the circumstances
standard and the narrowness of the special needs exception,
152 Id. at 1113 (quoting Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1139).
153 Id.
154 Kincade 1, 345 F.3d at 1113.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Infra Part W.A.
"' Infra Part IV.B.
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this determination is practically outcome determinative. More
fundamentally, in selecting one approach over the other, a
court defines the Fourth Amendment's limitations on the
government more profoundly than when it simply determines
whether a search is reasonable, or whether probable cause
exists.
The choice between the totality of the circumstances
standard and the special needs doctrine reflects two very
different interpretations of the Fourth Amendment's
safeguards. Under the totality of the circumstances test, courts
do not require any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, but
rather conduct a balancing test to determine whether the
reasonable privacy expectations of probationers or prisoners
have been violated by the suspicionless extraction of blood."
The primary justification for departing from the usual
requirement of individualized suspicion is the convicted
offenders' reduced expectation of privacy.' Under the special
needs approach, courts refrain from departing from the
traditional individualized suspicion requirement, unless there
are identifiable special needs beyond normal law enforcement
objectives.''
As applied to the DNA Act, the balancing approach has,
at most, tenable support from Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, and is indeed the less prudent choice. Aside
from exigencies... and other narrowly defined circumstances,"
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is necessary to search
an individual for purposes related to the general interest in
crime control.'" Moreover, the Supreme Court has made clear
that there are few exceptions to the individualized suspicion
'5 See supra Part III.A.
'60 See id. Cf. supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Knights in which the Supreme
Court departed from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements largely due to
the reduced privacy expectations of probationers).
161 See supra Part III.B.
162 See, e.g., Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) ("Of course, there
are circumstances that may justify a law enforcement check-point where the primary
purpose would otherwise, but for some emergency, relate to ordinary crime control. For
example,... the Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately
tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack. .. ").
l' See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557, 562 (1976)
(upholding a suspicionless checkpoint program designed to intercept illegal aliens
along the border).
16 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44; Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 n.15
(2001); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997).
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requirement165 and has discouraged the creation of new
categories of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.-
Nonetheless, the courts employing the totality of the
circumstances standard have in effect created a new category
of searches not requiring justification by any individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing, regardless of the search's purpose.
This simply does not comport with Supreme Court
precedent. The Court has not categorically denied prisoners
and probationers the protections of the traditional
individualized suspicion requirement."'6  Although these
individuals generally have diminished expectations of
privacy," they retain some privacy interests in their bodily
integrity." While the precise import of these privacy
' See, e.g., Edmond, 531 U.S. at 451 ("While such suspicion is not an
'irreducible' component of reasonableness, we have recognized only limited
circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply." (internal citations omitted)).
16 Kincade 1, 345 F.3d 1095, 1104 n.22 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985) ("We do not think that the Fourth
Amendment's emphasis upon reasonableness is consistent with the creation of a third
verbal standard in addition to 'reasonable suspicion' and 'probable cause[.")).
161 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 n.6 (2001) (reserving for
another time the question of whether suspicionless searches of probationers for normal
law enforcement purposes could be reasonable); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 558-
60 (1979) (expressing concern for inmates' bodily integrity, the Court wrote that
.convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their
conviction and confinement in prison").
16' See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119 (explaining that probationary status
diminishes an individual's privacy rights); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874
(1987) (same); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-28 (1984) (concluding that
prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells because of the
paramount interest in maintaining institutional order); Bell, 441 U.S. at 556-57 (1979)
(explaining that prisoners have a reduced expectation of privacy).
169 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 545, 558-60 (explaining that prisoners have some
Fourth Amendment rights); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) ("There is
no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and [convicted offenders]."). Cf Jones
v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 127-29 (1977) (holding that
inmates retain some First Amendment rights); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225
(1976) (holding that prisoners have the right to the protection of the Due Process
Clause); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) ("[A] prison inmate retains those
First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with
the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system."). See also Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) ("The importance of informed, detached and
deliberate determinations of the issue whether or not to invade another's body in
search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great."). Despite this premise, in
upholding DNA collection statutes under a balancing or totality of the circumstances
test, courts have said that prisoners and probationers have no legitimate expectation of
privacy in their correct identification. Groceman v. United States Dep't of Justice, 354
F.3d 411, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1160 (1996); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306-07
(4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992). This assertion misses the mark: The
issue is whether they have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the identifying
information of their blood. And, indeed they do. "To say that no reasonable privacy
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expectations is unclear, the Court has never approved a
suspicionless search of a prisoner or probationer without
reference to some special or legitimate penological need.'70
The plurality in Kincade II inaccurately suggested that
Knights signaled a retreat from requiring individualized
suspicion upon searching convicted offenders under state
supervision for normal law enforcement purposes.' 7' Explaining
that the Supreme Court in Knights upheld a warrantless
search of a probationer's home without mentioning the special
needs doctrine, it argued that the Court had departed from
Griffin v. Wisconsin which upheld a warrantless search of a
probationer's home within the special needs exception.17 But,
as the dissent noted in Kincade II, there was at least
reasonable suspicion that Knights was involved in the arson of
a vault, including the fact that a friend was seen leaving
Knights's apartment carrying pipe bombs, a fact that the
Supreme Court strongly emphasized in evaluating the totality
of the circumstances. 1
The plurality in Kincade II nonetheless found that it
was arbitrary to distinguish Knights and the DNA searches on
the basis of law enforcement's level of suspicion.' It
maintained that the special needs doctrine applies similarly to
interest protects against the search is to say that police officers have complete
discretion to conduct the search as they like." The Honorable Ronald M. Gould and
Simon Stem, Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth Amendment, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 777,
812 (2004).
17o See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) ("[Wlhen a prison regulation
impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests."); Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527-28 (justifying a
search of a prisoner's cell without individualized suspicion by reference to the needs of
institutional order and safety); Bell, 441 U.S. at 558-60 (justifying a search of a
prisoners' body cavities after contact visits without any individualized suspicion by
reference to the needs of institutional order and safety). For a recent case applying the
Turner standard to strip searches, see N.G. and S.G. v. Connecticut, No. 02-9274, 2004
U.S. App. LEXIS 18834, at *22-32 (2d Cir. Sept. 7, 2004). As the panel in Kincade I
held, the Fourth Amendment prohibits suspicionless searches of convicted offenders,
unless there are identifiable legitimate penological or special needs. See Kincade 1, 345
F.3d at 1096.
171 Kincade II, 379 F.3d at 827-30.
1 Id. at 828. See supra note 92 (discussing Griffin v. Wisconsin).
171 See Knights, 534 U.S. at 115, 121. After repeatedly emphasizing the
presence of reasonable suspicion throughout the opinion, the Court in the last
paragraph reminded us that "[t]he District Court found, and Knights concedes, that the
search in this case was supported by reasonable suspicion." Id. at 122. See Kincade II,
379 F.3d at 861-62 (Reinhardt J., dissenting) (explaining that the Court in Knights
departed from the special needs doctrine on the account of several factors, strongly
emphasizing "the fact that the search was supported by reasonable suspicion").
'74 Kincade H, 379 F.3d at 828-29.
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searches with reasonable suspicion and without.175 According to
the plurality, because Knights applied the totality of the
circumstances standard, instead of the special needs doctrine, a
suspicionless search could similarly be sustained by looking at
the totality of the circumstances. '76 But suspicionless searches
and suspicion-based searches are not interchangeable. The
dissent in Kincade H pointed out that "the line between
suspicionless law enforcement searches and searches based
upon reasonable individualized suspicion is as old as the
Fourth Amendment and is fundamental to the preservation of
the privacy interests which that provision protects. 77 The law
of suspicionless searches cannot blindly adopt the law of
suspicion-based searches simply because both types of searches
have appeared in the special needs context.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has exercised less
vigorous Fourth Amendment scrutiny in connection with
probationers in order to aid crime prevention.178 The Supreme
Court in Knights wrote: "[The state's] interest in apprehending
violators of the criminal law . . .may . . .justifiably focus on
probationers in a way that it does not on the ordinary citizen."179
It is conceivable that the Supreme Court will no longer require
individualized suspicion to search prisoners and probationers
due to their reduced expectation of privacy, regardless of the
normal law enforcement purpose of such searches.1"
Alternatively, the Court might consider probationers'
propensities to commit crime as a proxy for the normal
individualized suspicion requirement. 8' But these possibilities
remain conjectures. The Supreme Court has never found the
individualized suspicion requirement inapplicable to searches
171 Id. at 829.
176 See id. at 827-28.
177 Id. at 863 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting).
178 See, e.g., Knights, 534 U.S. at 121.
179 Id.
1 See id. at 121-22. See also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001)
(noting that diminished expectations of privacy may justify an exception to the warrant
requirement).
181 In Knights and Griffin, the Supreme Court emphasized that "'the very
assumption of the institution of probation' is that the probationer 'is more likely than
the ordinary citizen to violate the law.'" Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 (quoting Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987)). See also Connecticut v. Smith, 540 A.2d 679, 688-
89 (Conn. 1988) (upholding court imposed drug testing a year after the sentencing of
the probationer because the probationer had a history of drug abuse). But cf United
States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 188 (2d Cir. 2004) ("There is, indeed, a nearly
universal consensus that the criminal status of the probationer cannot, viewed on its
own, be sufficient to support a determination that 'reasonable suspicion' exists[.]").
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of prisoners and probationers without regard to some non-law
enforcement need. '82
As we have seen, many courts have analogized DNA
collection to fingerprinting to surmise that the Supreme Court
would uphold the DNA Act." The argument is that the
collection of DNA, like fingerprinting, should be viewed as part
of normal booking procedures." This analogy can only
withstand scrutiny if the DNA Act's primary objective is to
ascertain the identity of the individual in custody. As the
Kincade I court correctly noted, however, the primary purpose
for the samples retrieved under the Act is the gathering of
evidence for criminal investigations.' In fact, the DNA samples
are not collected until after the individual's identity is verified
and permanently recorded." When law enforcement officials
obtain evidence in furtherance of a criminal investigation,
whether via fingerprinting or blood extraction, individualized
suspicion must be present. '
This is not to suggest that it would be constitutional to
replace fingerprinting during the booking process with the
extraction of blood. Fingerprinting and DNA collection entail
distinct levels of intrusiveness. Unlike fingerprinting,
contemporary DNA analysis requires a compelled intrusion
beneath the skin, revealing and seizing fluid that is not
routinely exposed to public view.'"
182 See supra note 170. Accord Kincade 11, 379 F.3d at 862-63. In United States
v. Miles, the court maintained that there was "no Supreme Court case upholding a
suspicionless search of inmates, probationers, or supervisees where the justification for
the search was primarily law enforcement." 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1137 (E.D. Cal.
2002).
1w Groceman v. United States Dep't of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413-14 (5th Cir.
2004) (per curiam); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1339-40 (10th Cir. 1996); Rise v.
Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1559-60 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1160 (1996); Jones
v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992). But
see Kincade 11, 379 F.3d at 821-39 (failing to make the analogy between fingerprinting
and DNA collection).
'84 Groceman, 354 F.3d at 413-14 (quoting Jones, 962 F.2d at 306-07); Boling,
101 F.3d at 1339-40; Rise, 59 F.3d at 1559-60; Jones, 962 F.2d at 306-07.
1 Kincade I, 345 F.3d 1095, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2003). See generally 146 CONG.
REC. Sl1645 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000); 146 CONG. REC. H8572 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2000).
'8 See Kincade I, 379 F.3d at 857 n.16 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting) ("Claiming
that DNA profiles are designed to 'identify' the releasee, much like fingerprinting, is
disingenuous.").
187 Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816-17 (1985).
' Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989)
(explaining that there is a difference in the level of intrusion when the state searches
beneath the skin). Accord Kincade 1, 345 F.3d at 1100 ("Fingerprinting, involving
aspects of an individual's identity routinely exposed to public view, 'represents a much
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Moreover, as "the information containing blue print of
human life," DNA is fundamentally different than
fingerprints. 9 One respected scientist has described DNA
samples as a "future diary of genetic information.""' Unlike
fingerprinting, for example, DNA analysis reveals genetic
predispositions to a host of medical conditions."' Although the
government claims that the samples collected for CODIS are
taken from so-called "junk sites" of genetic information,"' it has
been said that these sites can also reveal genetic
predispositions to Type I diabetes.93
Even assuming that the samples are in fact "junk,"
while the blood samples sit in a warehouse and our genetic
knowledge develops, yesterday's "junk" will become tomorrow's
jewel."' Scientists have agreed that at some point, if not
already, the samples taken by law enforcement will reveal
less serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of searches and
detentions.' (quoting Hayes, 470 U.S. at 814)).
'89 Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in
Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Databanks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127, 156
(2001). See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (explaining that the nature of the information
retrieved from urinalysis increases the intrusiveness of the search). See also Kincade
11, 379 F.3d at 867 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("The startling advance of technology has
magnified the power of the initial search authorized by the DNA Act, such that the
invasion of privacy is vastly more significant that we might have previously
assumed.").
190 Mark Wills, Safeguarding the 'Future Diary' Encoded in the Human
Genome, Wright State Univ. of Med., at
http://www.med.wright.edu/whatsnew/daymed/0298.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
191 See, e.g., Symposium, The Human Genome Project, DNA Science and the
Law: The American Legal System's Response to Breakthroughs in Genetic Science, 51
AM. U.L. REV. 401, 424-25 (2002).
192 DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, H.R. Rep. No. 106-900(I),
27 (2000). For an explanation of junk sites, see Dan L. Burk, DNA Identification
Testing: Assessing the Threat to Privacy, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 87, 90-93 (1992); Rebecca
Sasser Peterson, Note, DNA Databases: When Fear Goes Too Far, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1219, 1222-23 (2000); Veronica Valdivieso, Note, DNA Warrants: A Panacea for Old,
Cold Rape Cases?, 90 GEO. L.J. 1009, 1013-17 (2002).
'9' Christine Rosen, Liberty, Privacy, and DNA Databases, THE NEW
ATLANTIS (Spring 2003), http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/l/rosenprint.htm
[hereinafter Rosen, THE NEW ATLANTIS]; Christine Rosen, DNA: Is the Ninth Circuit
Wrong?, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, (Oct. 14, 2003), at
http://www.nationalreview.com/debates/dna200310141029.asp. See also Burk, supra
note 192, at 94-95 (suggesting that "junk" sequences could one day be associated with
genetic abnormalities).
14 See Ronald M. Green & A. Matthew Thomas, DNA: Five Distinguishing
Features for Policy Analysis, HARv. J.L. & TECH. 571, 577 (1998); Burk, supra note 192,
at 94-95 ("As some molecular biologists have been known to quip, 'Garbage is
something you throw out; junk is something you keep.' ... Presumably, evolutionary
pressure would dictate that organisms discard such wasteful artifacts if in fact they
offer no competitive advantage.").
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genetic facts beyond mere identification.19 "[F]uture DNA
analysis may . . . reveal an individual's medical history;
proclivities toward certain diseases; and hereditary
information such as race, physical, and behavioral traits.""'
After even more time, "DNA donated today may expose the
progeny of the donors to new and unimagined forms of
stigmatism and discrimination."197 In contrast to fingerprinting,
DNA collection poses a far different threat to personal privacy
and autonomy.1
DNA samples' infinite capabilities also make them more
susceptible to abuse than fingerprints. Indeed, there are
inherent dangers whenever the government systematically
collects and disseminates our personal information." To say
that we can trust our government not to use DNA databanks
for purposes not authorized in CODIS is naive. °° As Judge
Reinhardt wrote:
The problem with allowing the government to collect and maintain
private information about the intimate details of our lives is that the
bureaucracy most often in charge of the information "is poorly
195 See, e.g., Burk, supra note 192, at 95.
196 Jeffrey S. Grand, Note, The Blooding of America: Privacy and the DNA
Dragnet, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2277, 2288 (2002). See also An Ancient Helper - Useful
"Junk" DNA: Some 'Junk' DNA May Have a Function, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 6, 2003),
2003 WL 58583958; Rosen, THE NEW ATLANTIS, supra note 193.
197 Green & Thomas, supra note 194, at 577.
'98 See id. at 578. Even more alarming is the inevitable potential of the DNA
Act to lead to a racially skewed genetic database. See Kaye and Smith, Case for
Population-Wide Coverage, supra note 15, at 452-55. Undoubtedly, black males will be
far more likely to be included in CODIS than their white counterparts. Id. at 453.
' See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae, Public Defender Service For the District
of Columbia, Kincade 11, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004), (No. 02-50380), available at
www.epic.org/privacy/kincade/pd-amicus.pdf (last visited on 9/27/04) [hereinafter
Public Defender Service].
'00 For example, the government promised in the 1930s that Social Security
numbers would only be used to assist in distributing benefits under the retirement
program. See, e.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Warns of
Privacy Abuses in Government Plan to Expand DNA Databases (March 1, 1999), at
http:l/www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=8422&c=129 (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
Now, they are used universally and almost any sophisticated enterprise can retrieve an
individual's social security number. Id. See also Timothy Lynch, Databases Ripe for
Abuse: Opposing View, CATO Inst. (Aug. 21, 2000), at
http://www.cato.org/research/articles/lynch-000821.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2004) ('If
we believe that tomorrow's political leaders will somehow be incapable of abusing their
power over a fully centralized DNA database, the next generation will never forgive
us-and rightly so."). DNA databases have in fact already been abused. Public
Defender Serv., supra note 199. Despite the military's promise that its DNA repository
would only be used to identify human remains, it has given the FBI its DNA, which is
now used to match DNA samples found at crime scenes. Id. The DNA Act has also been
utilized beyond the government's original expressed intentions. See generally supra
note 15.
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regulated and susceptible to abuse. This [] has profound social effects
because it alters the balance of power between the government and
the people, exposing individuals to a series of harms, increasing
their vulnerability and decreasing the degree of power that they
exercise over their lives." To allow such information to be collected
through the compulsory extraction of blood from the bodies of non-
consenting Americans runs contrary to the values on which this
country was founded." 1
This is compounded by the fact that the government
may contract with private entities to collect DNA samples from
qualifying convicted offenders. 2 There are several enterprises
interested in genetics that have a substantial but unfortunate
financial incentive to misuse the DNA samples collected for
CODIS. °3 As recent events have shown, the government's
motivation and ability to monitor and control private
enterprises is truly questionable.' As in other areas where our
government has invited the private sector to manage public
affairs, there is a greater susceptibility to corruption and
scandal.' Nonetheless, under the present statute, an
individual who uses a sample for an unauthorized purpose is
not subject to imprisonment and may only be subject to fines
up to one hundred thousand dollars."
In light of the sensitivity of DNA samples, DNA
collection must not be compared to fingerprinting. Rather, it is
a search with the capability of divulging incredibly personal
201 Kincade 11, 379 F.3d at 843 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting) (quoting Daniel J.
Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1083, 1105 (2002)).
202 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(4)(B).
203 For a brief discussion about the genetic industry and their potential to
misuse DNA databases, see generally Rosen, NEW ATLANTIS, supra note 193.
204 For example, many of the horrid abuses at Abu Ghraib have been
attributable to private contractors and their inability to manage the prison. As one
private interrogator who worked at Abu Ghraib explained, the private contractors in
charge focus on interrogating the most detainees as possible in a given day. As
evidenced by using cooks and truck drivers as interrogators, little concern is given to
the quality of interrogation or international human rights. See, e.g., Julian Borger,
Cooks and Drivers Were Working as Interrogators, THE GUARDIAN (May 7, 2004),
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0507-03.htm (last visited on 9/16/04).
205 A respected scientist averred that biotech companies are starving "to get
their hands on" DNA samples. Interview by Mark Compton with George J. Annas,
Professor & Chair of the Health Law Dep't Boston Univ. Sch. of Pub. Health, Genetic
Turf Wars: Whose DNA Is It Anyway?, DNA DISPATCH (November 2000),
http://www.geneforum.org/node/view/32 (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
206 42 U.S.C. 14135e(c).
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information-information that is even unknown to the owner.""
With so much at stake, it makes little sense to remove the
traditional protections afforded to convicted offenders under
the Fourth Amendment.n
Beyond the particular dangers in enforcing the DNA Act
is the dangerous precedent established by the plurality's
reasoning in Kincade IL If all it takes is diminished privacy
rights to suspend the traditional requirement of individualized
suspicion, then suspicionless searches would be commonplace
in our society.2" Under the rationale in Kincade H, for example,
a national DNA database could easily be sustained.10 Although
the plurality stated that the difference between the privacy
rights of convicted offenders and free citizens largely affected
its analysis, there are many "free" individuals in our society
who also face diminished privacy rights, including, but not
limited to, public school students, railroad operators, and
government employees.2 1'
The totality of the circumstances standard will
perpetually be overpowered by the government's interest in
solving more crimes.212  In contrast, the less malleable
individualized suspicion requirement provides a real and
measurable limit on the effectuation of the government's
normal law enforcement objectives. In the plurality's world, the
only safeguard from overzealous politicians and police is "the
willingness of the judiciary to weigh properly the relative
importance of the general law enforcement interests and the
individual's privacy right.""' Our liberty is better protected
when the state is required to have individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing before searching individuals to gather evidence for
the ordinary purposes of law enforcement." '
207 For an interesting discussion about the devastating psychological impact
on an individual who learns "that they carry genes that may predispose them to serious
medical problems" see Green & Thomas, supra note 194, at 572-73.
208 The Kincade I court explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's fingerprint
analogy in Rise. Kincade 1, 345 F.3d 1095, 1100 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003).
2 Kincade H, 379 F.3d 813, 864 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J. dissenting).
210 Cf. id. at 863-66 (arguing that under the plurality's reasoning, a vast array
of suspicionless searches of individuals not convicted of crimes could be upheld).
211 Id. at 864.
212 Id. at 865.
"'s Id. at 860.
211 See Kincade H, 379 F.3d at 866 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting).
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B. The Special Needs Analysis of the DNA Act
The issue therefore becomes whether the DNA Act in
fact serves normal law enforcement objectives. For a short
period, the Tenth and Ninth circuits were split on this issue.2
The Tenth Circuit held that the creation of a comprehensive
DNA database serves special needs beyond normal law
enforcement objectives,16 while the Ninth Circuit panel held
that the DNA Act's primary purpose is to solve crimes, a
normal law enforcement purpose.217
The Tenth Circuit's characterization of the DNA Act's
primary purpose is perhaps intentionally misleading.
Borrowing from Sczubelek,219 the Circuit narrowly identified the
Act's primary purpose in order to avoid the inevitable
conclusion that the Act serves normal law enforcement ends.
Instead of defining the primary purpose as the creation of
CODIS, the inquiry should have shed light on the objectives of
CODIS itself, since the primary purposes of the DNA Act and
CODIS are one in the same. Applying Sczubelek's logic to a
search of an individual's home for evidence of criminal
wrongdoing, the purpose of the search would be to effectuate
the search warrant and not to gather evidence for a criminal
investigation or prosecution.2 9
In fact, the legislative record is replete with references
to the connection between CODIS and crime solving.22 ° As one of
the legislative proponents proclaimed: "The purpose of [CODIS]
is to match DNA samples from crime scenes where there are no
suspects with the DNA of convicted offenders. Clearly, the
more samples we have in the system, the greater the likelihood
215 The Ninth Circuit panel's decision was quickly set aside and vacated en
banc, removing the split in the circuits. See supra Part I.
216 United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th. Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 945 (2003).
217 Kincade 1, 345 F.3d at 1096, 1110-1111.
218 See United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 322 (D. Del. 2003)
("The DNA Act ... was enacted to fill the CODIS system with DNA samples from
qualifying federal offenders."). See also United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d
1142, 1167 (S.D. Cal. 2002) ("Congress's immediate purpose in authorizing DNA
'searches' was to permit probation officers to fill the CODIS database with the DNA
fingerprints of all qualifying supervisees.").
2'9 As noted ealier, the Ninth Circuit panel similarly argued that "[tihe
purpose of these searches is no more to put samples into CODIS than is the purpose of
finger-printing to place cards into index files." Kincade 1, 345 F.3d at 1112.
210 See generally 146 CONG. REC. S11645 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000); 146 CONG.
REC H8572 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2000).
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we will come up with matches and solve cases. ""' Thus,
distinguishing between the creation of CODIS and the desire to
solve crimes is only possible by denying the algebraic similarity
between the two. It is "intellectually dishonest" to rely on such
a semantic disconnection to justify upholding the Act's
constitutionality."'
According to the Ninth Circuit panel, however, even if
the Act's primary purpose is the special need of creating
CODIS, the normal law enforcement objectives ultimately
achieved render the special needs exception inapplicable."' It
interpreted Supreme Court precedent as prohibiting
suspicionless searches "if either the immediate or the ultimate
objective serves a law enforcement purpose[.]J ' Indeed, the
Supreme Court has distinguished the import of a search's
primary objective from its ultimate objective."' In Ferguson, the
Supreme Court wrote:
In our opinion, this distinction is critical. Because law enforcement
involvement always serves some broader social purpose or objective,
: * * virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless search could be
immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining the search
solely in terms of its ultimate, rather than immediate, purpose. Such
an approach is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment.2 '
The Ninth Circuit suggested that "the reverse would be [no]
less objectionable."27 That is, a court cannot ignore the Act's
ultimate objectives by defining the purpose only in terms of its
immediate purpose.'
Because the Supreme Court has never quite suggested
this, it is more persuasive to debunk the characterization of the
DNA Act's primary purpose as a special need. First, consider
the argument in Sczubelek that although the Act's primary
purpose is to solve crimes, CODIS's method of crime solving is
not ordinary law enforcement activity because "[o]nly after the
[DNA] sample is analyzed and then evaluated against available
crime scene samples can the results inculpate or exculpate an
21 146 CONG. REC. H8572 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2000), at H8575-6.
2 United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1138 n.6 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
23 Kincade 1, 345 F.3d at 1112.
224 Id. (citing Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 82-84 (2001)).
222 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-84.
226 Id. at 84.
2 Kincade I, 345 F.3d at 1112.
228 See id.
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individual... 9 Consider, however, a search of a person's
dwelling with the intent to solve several murder cases. If the
police find a licensed gun in the person's home, they must later
analyze the gun and the bullet casings left at the crime scenes
in order to ascertain a match. Such a search does not fall
within the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment,
despite the fact that the gun by itself does not link the person
to the crime. The fact that a DNA sample, by itself, does not
reflect that the donor committed a crime is similarly
inconsequential.
Second, the Sczubelek court argued that CODIS is
distinct from ordinary crime solving because it offers only the
potential to solve crimes. 3' It emphasized that "a DNA sample
could remain unmatched or even unanalyzed for an indefinite
period" due to the backlog of samples. '31 Such a contention is
unpersuasive because the DNA Act is designed to eliminate the
backlog of samples that the Sczubelek court so ironically cites
as the reason the crime solving here is beyond ordinary law
enforcement. Further, a search does not necessarily serve a
special need because its derivative benefit, i.e., crime solving, is
delayed.
Lastly, the courts in both Miller and Sczubelek argued
that the Act serves objectives beyond normal law enforcement
because it solves future crimes or crimes that are not being
investigated by the particular DNA search.3 ' This distinction,
initially articulated in Nicholas v. Goord, '33 is simply a smoke
screen, specifically designed to cover the Act's blatant ordinary
law enforcement purpose. Regardless of whether the search is
disconnected from a particular crime, the special needs
exception does not encompass searches designed to collect
evidence for use in criminal prosecutions.2" In Edmond, for
instance, the Supreme Court held that a suspicionless highway
checkpoint program designed to detect drug-related crimes was
unconstitutional because it was indistinguishable from normal
229 United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 322 (D. Del. 2003).
230 Id.
231 Id.
... Miller v. United States Parole Comm'n, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1176 (D.
Kan. 2003); Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 322 n.14 (explaining that it would find
otherwise if there was evidence suggesting that the DNA search was directed at a
particular defendant in connection with a specific crime).
233 See supra note 112.
23 See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (2000).
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law enforcement activity." As the Court recently explained, the
infirmity was that it was "'justified only by the generalized and
ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may
reveal that any given [individual] has committed some crime.' '
This is precisely the motivation and objective of the searches
under the DNA Act.
What makes a special needs search "special" is that its
primary purpose is not to uncover evidence for criminal
prosecutions."7  The Supreme Court has erected an
insurmountable barrier between special needs searches and
searches designed to turn over evidence to law enforcement for
prosecutorial purposes. 3' For example, in National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Supreme Court upheld
suspicionless drug tests of United States Customs Service
employees who seek transfer or promotion to drug enforcement
positions, finding a special need to prevent promoting people
who use illicit drugs to those positions."2 In finding this search
to be reasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion, the
Court emphasized that the "[t]est results [could] not be used in
a criminal prosecution of the employee without the employee's
consent."24° Additionally, in Acton, the Supreme Court noted
that "the results of the [student drug] tests are disclosed only
to a limited class of school personnel . . . [,] and they are not
turned over to law enforcement authorities or used for any
internal disciplinary function." 1  Similarly, in Board of
Education School District No. 92 v. Earls, the Supreme Court
upheld suspicionless drug testing of students participating in
extra-curricular activities in part because the drug tests, under
no circumstances, could be turned over to law enforcement."
In contrast, the DNA Act's authorized search is
specifically designed to provide law enforcement officials with
evidence to solve crimes and increase prosecutions. Senators
235 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40-42.
23 Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885, 889 (2004) (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at
44) (emphasis in original).
237 See e.g., Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78-79 (2001).
m See Id. at 84-86. Accord Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42.
239 Natl Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 664-66 (1989).
240 Id. at 666.
241 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995).
242 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822, 833 (2002).
24 See generally 146 CONG. REC. S11645-02 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000), H8572-01
(daily ed. Oct. 2, 2000).
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argued that "[c]ollection of convicted offender[s'] DNA is crucial
to solving many of the crimes occurring in our communities.""
As a result, many law makers believed that "[t]his legislation
w[ould] be a huge asset for our local law enforcers in their day-
to-day fight against crime."245 As Congressman Canady of
Florida plainly put it: "[The DNA Act] will put more criminals
behind bars by correcting practical and legal obstacles that
leave crucial DNA evidence unused and too many violent
crimes unsolved." In light of this legislative record and the
plain text of the statute, the Act's ordinary law enforcement
nature is undeniable.247
Aside from apprehending criminal suspects, however,
the DNA Act serves to decrease wrongful prosecutions." Few
courts, not including the Tenth Circuit,24' have contended that
this brings the Act within the special needs exception. 20 The
court in United States v. Vore, for example, argued that there is
a special need in collecting DNA to prevent the execution of
innocent individuals on death row.2 ' The court noted that
"'post-conviction DNA testing and other post-conviction
investigative techniques have shown that innocent people have
been sentenced to death in the United States.' 252
Clearly, the goal of exonerating the innocent cannot
trigger special needs status. Put simply, an everyday
objective of law enforcement is to capture the right person.
Most Americans would hope to believe that the accurate
prosecution of crime is an implicit goal of police, detectives, and
146 CONG. REC. S11645-02 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000), at S11646.
245 Id.
2A6 146 CONG. REC. H8572-01 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2000), at H8577.
247As the Ninth Circuit panel concluded, "the record overwhelmingly
demonstrates that the Act mandating these suspicionless searches was enacted, is
enforced, and is understood by all concerned to serve the purpose of law enforcement,
and to further its objectives." Kincade I, 345 F.3d 1095, 1111 (9th Cir. 2003).
248 146 CONG. REC. H8572-01 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2000), at H8577. As Senator
Leahy pronounced: "[DNA] should be used to do what is equally scientifically reliable to
do--prove innocence." 146 CONG. REC. S11645-02 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000), at S11647.
249 See United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th. Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 945 (2003).
'50 See Vore v. United States Dep't of Justice, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137 (D.
Ariz. 2003) (concluding that the exoneration of the innocent is a special need); United
States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (same).
251 Vore, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 1137.
252 Id. (quoting 146 CONG. REC. S11645-02 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000), at S11645).
253 See Kincade 1, 345 F.3d 1095, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2003). See supra Part
III.B.2 for the Ninth Circuit panel's argument that exonerating the innocent is not a
special need.
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prosecutors.2 " Seemingly, courts have attempted to detract
from the DNA Act's normal law enforcement purposes by
pointing to the laudable goal of exonerating the innocent. 5
Moreover, as a practical matter, exonerating an
individual by collecting his DNA is indistinguishable from
advancing the government's interest in normal law
enforcement objectives." Primarily, DNA evidence can
exculpate a suspect if his DNA does not match the DNA found
at the crime scene. "[Like a good alibi, the sample would only
eliminate him from the field of suspects under investigation.
'
M
7
Otherwise, the exoneration of the innocent will only occur by
inculpating the individual being searched." As the district
court in United States v. Miles opined, "the asserted interest in
accurate prosecution is nothing more than the other side of the
same law enforcement coin.""9
Courts have also argued that "[tihe use of probation
officers . . . suggests Congress' intent to isolate [DNA
databanks] from the responsibility of ordinary law
enforcement."2 2 To the contrary, blood samples retrieved from
individuals are immediately sent to the FBI for analysis and
storage. 1 Probation and correction officers are only responsible
for the collection of the blood, while the subsequent analysis
and storage is the task of the FBI 2 -clearly a normal law
enforcement organization. The samples are then available to
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to use in
solving criminal cases, creating "'a penal character with a far
greater connection to law enforcement than other searches
sustained under [the] special needs rationale."'2
For example, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Association, the Supreme Court noted its concern with holding
214 See United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1139 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
25 As the Ninth Circuit panel noted: "The presence of a 'benign' motive cannot
'justify a departure from Fourth Amendment protections, given the pervasive
involvement of law enforcement.'"Kincade 1, 345 F.3d at 1112 (quoting Ferguson v.
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85 (2001)).
256 Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1139.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 323 (D. Del. 2003).
261 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(b). See also Kincade 1, 345 F.3d 1095, 1111 n.30 (9th
Cir. 2003).
262 See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(b).
26 Kincade 1, 345 F.3d at 1111 (quoting Ferguson v, Charleston, 532 U.S. 67,
88-89 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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railroad supervisors responsible for warrant procedures in
administering employee drug tests." The Court opined that
imposing such procedures on individuals who have no
connection to law enforcement would be unreasonable."5 In
contrast, it does not seem unreasonable to expect designated
probation and correction officers to familiarize themselves with
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, considering their
primary role in supervising probationers and prisoners and
their close relationship with law enforcement officials.
The DNA Act is also easily distinguished from the few
cases where the Supreme Court has recognized special needs in
law enforcement contexts. Such application has only occurred
in extraordinary situations where a warrant or probable cause
requirement would undoubtedly threaten public safety.6' In
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Supreme
Court upheld the Fourth Amendment constitutionality of a
suspicionless sobriety checkpoint because the search's primary
purpose was to remove dangerous drunk drivers from the road,
despite the secondary law enforcement purpose of
apprehending DWI suspects. 7 Additionally, in Skinner, the
Supreme Court upheld suspicionless drug testing of railroad
employees immediately following railroad accidents." The
Court concluded that the search in Skinner was not designed to
"assist in the prosecution of employees, but rather 'to prevent
accidents and casualties in railroad operations that result from
impairment of employees by alcohol or drugs.' 2.
Conversely, where there is no immediate threat to
public safety, the Fourth Amendment prohibits a normal law
enforcement search absent individualized suspicion.27 Although
26 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 623-24 (1989)
(upholding suspicionless drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees immediately
following train accidents under the special needs exception).
26 Id. at 623-24 (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987)). The
Court explained that '[r]ailroad supervisors, like school officials, and hospital
administrators, are not in the business of investigating violations of the criminal laws
or enforcing administrative codes, and otherwise have little occasion to become familiar
with the intricacies of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 623.
266 See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); Skinner,
489 U.S. at 620-21.
26. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444. See also Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43 (2000)
(explaining its holding in Sitz).
'6 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602.
269 Id. at 620-21.
170 See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (holding that
Georgia's requirement that candidates for state office pass a drug test is outside the
category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches).
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"[tihe detection and punishment of almost any criminal offense
serves broadly the safety of the community,"271 the DNA Act
simply does not address the "type of immediate . . . threat to
life and limb that the . . . [searches] in Sitz [and Skinner were]
designed to eliminate.".72 In fact, the DNA Act is in part
designed to ultimately prevent crime before it even happens."'
A more convincing comparison is between the DNA Act
and special need searches of convicted offenders under state
supervision as was upheld in Griffin. But as the panel
appropriately recognized in Kincade I, the search's purpose in
Griffin is distinguishable from the search authorized under the
DNA Act. 4 In Griffin, the reduction in individualized suspicion
was justified by the special need to supervise probationers, and
thus was directly related to the administration of parole itself
rather than the solving of crimes.7 The DNA Act is
disconnected from the interest in supervision because it targets
the criminal activity of individuals after their probationary
status has expired.27 An individual's blood remains in CODIS
well after the state's responsibility of supervision has ceased. 7
Plus, the DNA Act applies predominantly to prisoners.7
And, as the Second Circuit in Roe v. Marcotte argued
with regard to Connecticut's DNA statute, "none of the 'special
271 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 43.
272 Id.
273 Deterrence is indeed one of the objectives of the Act. See 146 CONG. REC.
S11645-02 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000), at S11648. One legislator noted that the DNA Act
would help reduce the chances "that many of these violent felons will repeat their
crimes once they are back in society." Id. at S11646. See Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72,
82 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting DNA statutes' ability to prevent recidivism). See also United
States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1168 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (citing 146 CONG. REC.
S11645-02 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000), at S11646) (same).
274 Kincade I, 345 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003). See also Kincade 11, 379
F.3d 813, 857 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J. dissenting) (distinguishing the search in
Griffin from the DNA Act); supra Part III.B.2 (same).
275 GrifFin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) ("A State's operation of a
probation system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or its
supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents 'special needs,' beyond normal
law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-
cause requirements.").
276 Kincade I, 345 F.3d at 1103 ("By contrast, the purpose of obtaining DNA
samples is to obtain material for future use in a permanent DNA databank to help
solve future crimes, no matter how long after the end of a parole term they may be
committed."). Accord Kincade H, 379 F.3d at 856-57 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting).
277 See generally supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
276 See, e.g., Kincade H, 379 F.3d at 858 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting) ("The
overwhelming majority of individuals convicted of federal offenses are not sentenced to
probation; they are sentenced to prison, where, under the Act, the compulsory
extraction of blood samples occurs.").
[Vol. 70:1
COMPULSORY EXTRACTION OF BLOOD
needs' cases involving prisons... is precisely on point" because
the statute "is not motivated by concerns for inmate safety and
health, institutional order, or discipline."279  That same
motivation was also lacking in the passage of the DNA Act."
The Act is thus distinguishable from the suspicionless searches
of prisoners upheld in Bell v. Wolfish.28' The Supreme Court in
Bell sustained suspicionless searches of detainees' body cavities
not only because of the detainees' reduced expectations of
privacy, but because the search served the legitimate
penological needs of maintaining security and order in the
prison setting.8' The DNA Act's legislative history simply does
not indicate that it was designed to promote penological
objectives.'
Nor is the DNA Act similar to the regime of
suspicionless administrative searches upheld by the Supreme
Court." In the leading case of New York v. Burger, the Court
upheld a search pursuant to an administrative scheme
designed to ensure that individuals in the business of vehicle
dismantling were not involved in automobile theft."2 The
Supreme Court explained that administrative searches of
highly regulated businesses deserve special needs protection,
only if their primary purposes are distinct from the general
interest in crime control." The Court concluded that the
suspension of normal Fourth Amendment requirements may be
justified even if the administrative inspection generates
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. 7 But the Court
emphasized that the search's immediate purposes must be
279 Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1999). Cf. Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1984) (justifying searches of prisoners' cells due to the need to
maintain institutional order and safety).
2W See generally 146 CONG. REC. S11645-02 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000), H8572-01
(daily ed. Oct. 2, 2000).
281 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
82 Id. at 559-60.
283 See generally 146 CONG. REC. S11645-02 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000), H8572-01
(daily ed. Oct. 2, 2000).
'8 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712 (1987) (upholding warrantless
inspections of vehicle dismantling businesses under the special needs exception);
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981) (upholding warrantless inspections of
mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (upholding warrantless
compliance checks of sporting weapons vendors); Camara v. Mun. Court of San
Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 531 (1967) (upholding suspicionless inspections of apartments
for housing code violations).
285 Burger, 482 U.S. at 714-15.
2N Id. at 713.
287 Id. at 716-17.
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narrower than the penal objectives ultimately achieved.' In
Burger, "[tihe discovery of evidence of other violations would
have been merely incidental to the purposes of the
administrative search." 9 Unlike in Burger, the DNA Act has no
identifiable administrative purpose, but rather is solely
designed to accurately solve past and future crimes."
Indeed, the Fourth Amendment's special needs
exception is amorphous and perhaps intentionally flexible in
order to accommodate compelling objectives. However, the
Supreme Court has clearly explained that searches designed to
gather evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing have no place
in special needs jurisprudence. The DNA Act undoubtedly
serves the purpose of solving crimes, and moreover, it cannot
be said to serve a special need simply because it employs
innovative technology. Courts have an obligation to construe
and apply the Fourth Amendment to growing technologies,
even if doing so arguably disrupts the efforts of law
enforcement."9 To this end, the Ninth Circuit panel correctly
held that the Act is unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment unless it requires reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing."'
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Kincade I is an easy
target for critics because it disregarded Congress's effort to put
more criminals behind bars. We must remember, however, that
the judiciary's task is not to rubber stamp congressional action,
but to determine whether the Constitution is respected.
Instead of succumbing to political pressure, the Kincade I
decision correctly and honestly applied Supreme Court
precedent. The decision is an excellent display of judicial
review and a reminder of the necessary constitutional
restraints on the ever-growing police state. Its replacement, the
Ninth Circuit en banc decision, is troubling not only for its
2 Id.
289 Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83 n.21 (2001).
9o See supra text accompanying notes 243-48 (describing the DNA Act's
objectives).
291 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473-74 (1928) (Brandeis, J.
dissenting) ("Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth.").
291 Kincade I, 345 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th Cir. 2003).
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specific holding, but its disregard for the most common sense
protection we enjoy from government search and seizure: the
requirement of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.
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